This text is based on my Finnish-language blog
“Those ‘ordinary Russians’ fighting in the Armed Forces of Russia” (Fin.
Ne ”tavalliset venäläiset” sotimassa Venäjän riveissä), which I published on July 8, 2023. For readers’ information, I have
added more individual pictures to the blog. You should also note that some of
the Russians living in Finland I mentioned in the blog have lived in our
country for years or even decades. So, their enlistment as mercenaries or their
support of Russian warfare cannot therefore be explained by the fact that they
had only lived in Finland for a short time. Due to the Finnish Criminal Code,
I have covered the faces of some of the pictures. Persons whose faces are
covered live permanently in Finland.
Those “ordinary Russians” living in Finland:
joining to Armed Forces of Russia
Over the years, I have made observations and
written them down in the form of blogs about Finns fighting in Russia’s proxy
forces or Russian subordinate forces in Eastern Ukraine; equally, I have
observed the participation of Finns and Russians living in Finland in
anti-Ukraine campaigning and information warfare in Finland and other
countries. Part of this kind of campaigning can be considered a hybrid
influence aimed at Finland – in practice a hybrid war, because for Russia it’s
all about warfare, not hybrid influence. We Finns just scorn the name hybrid
war, perhaps because in our mind’s warfare has a more concrete purpose meaning “blood
and guts.”
In this blog, my attention is focused
especially on Russians living in Finland who enlist in the Russian forces in
Ukraine or support Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, some have been
doing this since 2014, when the war in Donbas began.
 |
Photo collage of Finns and Russians living in
Finland working for Russia. |
On June 27, 2023, Helsingin Sanomat
published a background article “On Russia’s side” (Venäjän puolella),
in which the journalists examined the hidden network of foreign fighters who
fought in the Armed Forces of Russia in Eastern Ukraine. Marie-Agnes
Strack-Zimmermann, chairwoman of the German Parliament’s defense committee,
said the following about the network in question:
“Such people with real war experience - who
possibly killed others without remorse - are dangerous to our society.” (1)
With the article, I decided to write a blog
about my own observations about Russians living in Finland (or people who speak
Russian and living in Finland) who have participated in the war with the
Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine in one way or another. This group also
includes Russians who lived in Finland and have returned to Russia after
February 24, 2022, to participate in Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine.
However, at the beginning of my writing, a
brief review of the involvement of Russians or pro-Russians living in Finland
in activities supporting Russia and influence in Finland, after Russia’s
occupation of the Crimean Peninsula (February-March 2014) and the war started
in Eastern Ukraine in April 2014. Their activity has been so long-term, and it
has involved so much various levels of activism that this review only includes
some key points and noteworthy events (with sources and background text links).
One of the most significant branches of this
activity, influence and activism that includes targeted harassment is the
result of an article written by Yleisradio journalist Jessikka Aro
about the Russian troll factory. (2) Mainly Finns participated in the
widespread harassment (it was practically psychological violence), but in which
e.g., Johan Bäckman use of his contacts in Russia building it up. He
also used various Russian media for a smear campaign against journalist Aro. I
recommend everyone to read the non-fiction book ‘Putinin trollit –
Tositarinoita Venäjän infosodan rintamilta’ of Russia’s information war
written by Jessikka Aro and translated into several languages.
For years, attention in Finland was paid only
to information influencing and propagandistic communication carried out by
Russia and the Russians living in our country. Involvement in other activism
and possible hybrid warfare operations emerged more broadly in connection with
investigations related to special real estate deals and construction projects.
But even then, Finland was careful not to talk about Russia’s possible hybrid
operations or preparations for some Gray area activity. In her book ‘Putinin
pihapiirissä,’ Tuula Malin brings up vague business acquaintances
along with numerous shady real estate transactions. Despite this, e.g., in the
case of Airisto’s pearl (Airiston Helmi), the official
communications in Finland spoke of financial crime, while in Latvia, on the
other hand, in the case of the same oligarch – Pavel Melnikov – there
was essentially a more direct reference to possible security threats that the
person’s holdings in the country create. (3)
The support of the Russian administration’s
politics and imperialist wars of conquest was best seen in Finland precisely in
the field of information influence and propaganda war. After Russia occupied
the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in February-March 2014, activities
supporting Russia began to be organized more widely in Finland, by Finns who
support the Russian regime and Russians living in Finland. In the beginning,
their public activities were oriented towards events that received media
coverage. At that time, the attitude of the Finnish media to the events was
childishly naive, some journalists even seemed to believe the propaganda
stories about “separatism” in Donbas and “persecuting the Russians.”
The later events were clearly more propagandistic, which the Finnish media
could take a more critical view of.
In addition to the organization of various
events and occasions, association activities played a more visible role, in
which Finns and persons of Russian background living in Finland – or persons
who declared themselves Russian in the armed forces – actively participated. Among
the prominent associations, the DNR-edustamiskeskus ry ( appeared as the
official representative of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” in Finland.
Naturally, it didn’t really have that role, even though the people behind the
operation claimed so. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland had to correct
the disinformation spread by the association. (4)
DNR-edustamiskeskus ry and Donetskin
kansantasavallan ystävät Suomessa organized a few Christmas parties, which
were attended not only by Finns but also by Russians living in Finland. At
least once among the guests was also Natalia Nikonorova from the
occupied territories of eastern Ukraine. At that time, Nikonorova appeared at
the event in the role of “Foreign Minister,” which role she had in the
puppet administration appointed by the Kremlin. In the first years of its
activity, DNR-edustamiskeskus ry was highly active as a spreader of propaganda
and disinformation. Propaganda material from Russia and the occupied territories
of eastern Ukraine was also brought to Finland through it. In the last years of
visible activism, among the collaborators of DNR-edustamiskeskus ry was also RUFI
– suomalais-venäläinen yhdistys ry, which supported the imperialist policy
of the Russian government, and was headed by Daria Skippari-Smirnov at
the time.
Under Skippari-Smirnov’s leadership, the first Immortal
Regiment March was organized in Finland in May 2017. (5) After this,
Skippari-Smirnov has organized two more Immortal Regiment marches in the name
of RUFI and, after the corona pandemic, in May 2022, a car march that
ended in Helsinki. During the active years, a lot of disinformation and
pro-Russia propaganda was shared on the association’s social media platforms
and website. Under the leadership of Skippari-Smirnov, the association also
played a prominent role in the journey to the Russian-occupied Crimean
Peninsula in the spring of 2018.
Johan Bäckman’s recruitment of fighters to the
Russian proxy forces in Eastern Ukraine (especially in 2015 and 2016), and the
delivery of various materials to the war zone in Eastern Ukraine through
Russia, played its part in the activities in Finland. People of Russian
background living in Finland and the companies they own also have part of this
activity. (6)
I have previously written several blogs on the
subject, the most recent one in December 2021. In recent years, the Finnish
media have also more actively examined such activities and direct participation
in hostilities in the Armed Forces of Russia – this was also the case in the
extensive article published in Helsingin Sanomat and the articles
published in Yleisradio in autumn and winter 2021. (7 and 8) In my blogs,
I have focused mainly on the recruitment of fighters of Finnish background. But
this time I am focusing on the participation of people of Russian background
living in Finland in the war in Eastern Ukraine and specifically in the Armed
Forces of Russia. Helsingin Sanomat’s article on ‘Venäjän puolella’ offers
an excellent basis from which to proceed.
Onko tšuhna nenästä vedettävä – Are we Finns
idiots, in Russian tšuhna is a derogatory term used for Finns
After the introduction, we can then move on to
the matter itself, i.e., to examine the participation of persons of Russian
background living in Finland in the Russian Army in the war in Ukraine. In my
writing, however, I ignore the examination of the mercenary army connected to Gennadi
Timchenko, which has recently caused a lot of buzz in Finland as well. (9)
The reason for sidelining the topic is simple. A closer look at the mercenary
army, or Redut, connected to Timchenko would make this article far too
long. But the fact that before this year no attention was paid in Finland to
Timchenko’s ownership of Redut, speaks volumes about the secrecy that has
prevailed around Gennadi Timchenko on a wider scale. Note Timchenko also has
Finnish citizenship!
In Finland, the idea that Vladimir Putin’s
political opponents in Russia would automatically oppose the war (or the
so-called special operation) has been pampered for a very long time. However,
such a belief is completely wrong! In May 2023, Sergei Porohovoi, an
activist of The Other Russia of E. V. Limonov party who lived in Finland
for more than a decade, returned to Russia of his own free will, announcing
that he was ready to join the forces of the Interbrigady movement
operating in the Russian-occupied Donbas region as a volunteer. Interbrigady movement
have been fighting against Ukraine as part of Russian forces in eastern Ukraine
since 2014. The forces in question are suspected of having committed war crimes
in the war zone of eastern Ukraine. According to an activist source known to
Porohovoi, Porohovoi decided to return to Russia, after life in Finland became
mentally impossible due to Ukraine frenzy and Russophobia. (10)
In The Other Russia of E. V. Limonov party, founded by Eduard Limonov,
extreme leftism and fascism were combined into a national Bolshevik ideology. National
Bolshevism is a political movement that combines nationalism and
Bolshevism. The ideological anti-Americanism is also significant for the
movement. The original goal of The Other Russia of E. V. Limonov party has
been, among other things, referendums in Russian-majority areas in Russia’s
border neighbours on joining Russia. Today, Russia has become radicalized to
such an extent that National Bolshevism is not much different from the “ideology”
in power in Russia, where Putinism and fascism have combined to
form Russism. Now we must ask ourselves whether we have been a little
too naive when it comes to Putin’s political opponents and our attitude towards
them.
Porohovoi was one of Putin’s ideological
opponents, but he has returned to Russia and is ready to participate in Russia’s
brutal war against Ukraine, but how many ‘porohovoi’s’ have we raised on
our knees?
In Helsingin Sanomat’s article on ”Venäjän
puolella,” comments are asked from a Russian living in Finland, Pavel
i.e., Pavel N, about his participation in the war with Russia against
Ukraine. Pavel, like many others, acknowledges that he was on a humanitarian
mission and did not participate in the fighting. The same was claimed by
British citizen Benjamin Stimson, who years ago in Great Britain was
sentenced to several years in prison for participating in the war in Russian
proxy forces against the Ukrainian government. (11) Stimson, like Pavel, has
appeared in pictures with an assault rifle in a war zone, which was enough for
Stimson to be sentenced.
In the Helsingin Sanomat article, a picture of
Pavel holding a weapon that looks like an assault rifle has been picked up. According
to Pavel, it is a weapon used in airsoft. A couple of active reservists gave me
a reasoned dissenting opinion, so it may or may not be an airsoft gun. On the
social media of Pavel’s friends, you can find more interesting pictures in
which Pavel N. also appears – in some of the pictures, armed.
Some of the pictures in which Pavel N. and his
friends appear were probably taken in connection with airsoft, but the activity
and training seen in some of the pictures reminds me of something other than
airsoft. Based on the dilapidated buildings visible in the photos, they were
taken somewhere other than Finland. Based on the names of the people in the photos,
I would conclude that they were taken either around St. Petersburg in Russia or
possibly in the eastern parts of Estonia.*
 |
Pavel N., partial image of the original image. |
 |
“Airsoft” training “out there somewhere.” |
 |
A picture of the area where Russians living in
Finland also go to practice “airsoft.” Location likely near St. Petersburg, Russia. |
The pictures inevitably remind me of the
pictures from years ago that were published from the Partizan camps
organized by the Russian Imperial Movement or from the camps of the Evraziyskiy
Soyuz molodezhi i.e. ESM, which were attended by teens and a young
adult from the eastern parts of Ukraine years before the war started by Russia
in 2014. (12 and 13) ESM’s ideological “youth camps” were events where Eurasianism
(or neo-Eurasianism) was spread to Russia's neighbouring countries
through the networks created. Along with Evraziyskiy Soyuz molodezhi, similar
activities were also carried out through Mezhdunarodnoe Evraziyskoe Dvizhenie,
both based on the ideas of Aleksandr Dugin.
When browsing the social media network of Pavel
N and his friends, there are also other persons of Russian background who
declare their place of residence in Finland, who have delivered material aid at
least since 2014 to the war zone of eastern Ukraine, more precisely, to the
areas occupied by Russia. This means that, with a very high probability, they
have driven to the area via Russia (at the very least guilty of the Ukrainian
state border crime, at the most a lot more). “Cure Morozov,” who claims
to be based in Turku, has published a picture on social media which are taken
in frontline conditions, along with aid pictures.
Despite the international verdict and Russia's
extensive war crimes, February 24, 2022, has not formed a limit to Russian
support for Russia by Russians living in Finland or pro-Russian Finns. As can
be seen from the Helsingin Sanomat article, Pavel N has been sharing PMC
Wagner’s recruitment ads on social media since February 24, 2022, but has
gone even further. I know of at least one case where a man of Russian
background who moved to Finland a few years ago (before the corona pandemic) – Yevgeni
K – has returned to Russia to participate in Russia’s war of aggression
against Ukraine.
Yevgeni K’s background is so interesting that
you would think it would also arouse our authorities. According to reliable
information, before moving to Finland, he worked in Russia in special forces
under the Ministry of the Interior in St. Petersburg and/or the Leningrad
region, rising to the rank of officer. He moved to Finland after his service
contract ended. Those who know him suspect (justifiably) that Yevgeni K hid his
true work history and background when he arrived in Finland.
It can at least be stated that, so far, the
actions of our authorities regarding the investigation of the actions of those
who fought in the Russian forces have been quite lax. Coincidentally, just
today Ilta-Sanomat published an extensive article that talked about the
long-running investigation by the Häme police and The National Bureau of
Investigation, the target of which is a Russian man living in Finland, who,
according to Ukrainian sources, has fought in the PMC Wagner owned by Yevgeni
Prigozhin. (14) It is noteworthy that the man was treated as a possible
witness in the chain of events related to the shot down of Malaysia Airlines
flight MH17.
 |
| Image from the Ilta-Sanomat article, July 8, 2023. |
It is interesting that Suojelupoliisi – Finnish
Security and Intelligence Service (Supo) has not publicly paid
attention to the Finnish foreign fighters who fought in the forces of Russia in
Eastern Ukraine. Instead, in his national terrorism threat assessment published
this spring, Supo warns about individual extremists who have traveled to fight
on the other side, i.e., with the Ukrainian forces. A journalist from Helsingin
Sanomat asked Supo what they think about those Finns who have participated in
the war in Donbas on the Russian side – “Does Supo consider them a security
threat? What kind of security risk can they cause when they return to Finland?”
(15) Supo’s answer was that they have nothing to comment on. Instead, according
to researcher Kacper Rekawek, who specializes in foreign fighters who
fought in Ukraine, foreign fighters who have returned to their home countries
and fought in the ranks of Russia are especially now a security threat – “In
practice, they are Russian agents.” (16)
The same evasion on the part of our authorities
was already noticeable years ago, when I made a request for an investigation
into the activities of Johan Bäckman and Janus Putkonen. I covered the
case in more detail in my blog on December 4, 2021. For those who can’t read
the blog, I state that the National Prosecution Authority decided that
there is no reason for a preliminary investigation. I was hoping that tšuhna
has caught on since then, but I’m afraid I’m wrong. The Russians are still
laughing at the naive tšuhna!
Marko
Sources:
1. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html (Behind paywall).
2. https://kioski.yle.fi/omat/kioski-pietarin-trollitehtaalla
3. https://ir.lv/2018/11/30/russias-hand/
4. https://vartiopaikalla.blogspot.com/2017/12/kaiken-takana-on-backman.html
5. https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/a/venalaisten-yhdistys-tuomassa-voitonpaivan-kuolemattoman-rykmentin-marssia-suomeen-64692/#194c9420
6. https://vartiopaikalla.blogspot.com/2019/03/kalastelua-johan-backmanin-verkoilla.html
7. https://yle.fi/a/3-12153718
8. https://yle.fi/a/3-12210484
9. https://www.iltalehti.fi/ulkomaat/a/ccc85850-6026-4ef4-9b2a-2e673a603fef
10. https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009578041.html
11. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/british-man-prorussian-forces-ukraine-jailed-terrorism-benjamin-stimson-a7842521.html
12. https://m.vk.com/partizan_kurs
13. http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2016/01/how-alexander-dugins-neo-eurasianists.html
14. https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009701271.html
15. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html
16. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html
*: When analyzing the networks of people of
Russian background living in Finland, it is also revealed that at least some of
them have connections with the Russian imperialist Russian Imperial Movement,
or RIM, headquartered in St. Petersburg. As well as to members of RIM who have
fought in the Russian forces in eastern Ukraine.
RIM organizes military training for various
groups in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region. The courses organized by it
have also been attended by members of the Nordic Resistance Movement. I would
not consider it impossible that Russians living in Finland would go to RIM’s
camps to train. Yes, maybe at these camps they practice that “airsoft”!
Note – In the near future, I will translate the
continuation of this blog into English, where I will be more specific about the
connections of Russians living in Finland to Russian extremists, such as the
Russian Imperial Movement.
#StandWithUkraine
