Those ‘ordinary Russians living in Finland’ – connections to Russian extremists

 

This text is based on my Finnish-language blog “Ne ’tavalliset Suomessa asuvat venäläiset’ sotimassa Venäjän riveissä – kytköksiä venäläisiin ekstremisteihin), which I published on July 25, 2023. For readers’ information, I have added more individual pictures to the blog, and I wrote a short comment at the end of the blog about the case of Yan Petrovsky aka Voislav Torden, a Russian neo-Nazi and second founder of DShRG Rusich. (*) Readers should also note that some of the Russians I mentioned in the blog have lived in our country for years or even decades. So, their enlistment as mercenaries or their support of Russian warfare cannot therefore be explained by the fact that they had only lived in Finland for a short time. Due to the Finnish Criminal Code, I have covered the faces of some of the pictures, especially from persons who live permanently in Finland.

This blog is a continuation of my blog – Those “ordinary Russians” living in Finland: joining to Armed Forces of Russia – published on August 22, 2023.

 

Those ‘ordinary Russians living in Finland’ – connections to Russian extremists 

During the spring and summer, when I was setting up networks of people of Russian background living in Finland for the blog “Those ‘ordinary Russians’ living in Finland: joining to Armed Forces of Russia”, I noticed that at least some of the Russians living in Finland have close connections with Russian far-right organizations – probably the contact networks are still active, even though traveling between the countries has been significantly restricted. For example, the imperialist Russian Imperial Movement, or RIM (Ven. Русское Имперское Движение), with its “headquarters” in St. Petersburg, came to the fore. RIM has trained and equipped militants for the Russian forces in Ukraine, in addition, militants from its armed wing – the Imperial Legion – have been volunteers in Russian forces in Ukraine since 2014. (1) Imperial Legion fighters have also participated in hostilities in the Middle East and on the African continent, in January 2020, RIM announced that its fighter was killed in Libya. (2) Russia supports warlord Khalifa Haftar in the Libyan war.

In addition to the previous one, the Russian Imperial Movement organizes military training for various groups in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region. The courses organized by it have also been attended by members of the national socialist Nordic Resistance Movement. Two of its Swedish members who attended the Partizan Camp, Anton Thulin and Viktor Melin, have been identified in photographs. They traveled through Finland to RIM’s Partizan camp in August 2016. (3)

Some of the pictures published by the Finno-Russians of “airsoft” training seem to have been taken in a Soviet-era environment based on the building stock – probably in Russia, a theme I will return to in more detail later in this article. The conclusion is also supported by a German Focus article from a few years ago, the main topic of which was the “military training” received by German neo-Nazis and the extreme right-wing members at the Partizan camp organized by RIM. (4) In the Focus article, it was mentioned that there were also unidentified Finns in the same camps. At least some Finno-Russians have in these “airsoft” exercises that they claim to have attended on their equipment or clothes the marks that combine the flags of Finland and Russia.

According to The Soufan Center, all the men who attend the Partizan camps organized by RIM to receive so-called military training belong to the extreme right wing and are white supremacists or neo-Nazis. RIM’s Partizan lager usually lasts one to two weeks, 10-15 men take part in the course at one time. (5) The lager program includes small group tactics and seizure of buildings, and to study bomb making, sniper shooting and studying combat first aid. According to Stanislav Vorobjev, a member of RIM’s management, more than five hundred men have been trained at the Partizan lager (or its predecessor) between 2011 and 2017. (6) The Russian Imperial Movement has also cooperated with the Russian intelligence officer Igor Girkin, who was arrested on July 21, 2023, at least in the early stages of the war in Ukraine, i.e., in 2014 and 2015. (7)

On July 8, 2023, Ilta-Sanomat reported on a Russian man living in Finland who, according to Ukrainian sources, had fought in PMC Wagner in 2014. (8) At that time, PMC Wagner was still owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin. Finnish National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) interviewed him as a witness in the investigate on into the shooting down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17. He said during the interrogations that he does not recognize the persons in military uniforms in the photographs (found in his possession). In the photo collage below, there is a screenshot of the news in question, in the picture the militants are holding the flag of the Tsarist Russian Empire. This flag is used in Russia especially by extreme right-wing groups that support the Russian Empire. When the war started by Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the flag has been used as a symbol by RIM’s Imperial Legion (mentioned above) and other far-right groups who dream of restoring the “honour” and borders of the Russian Empire. Some units of the Russian armed forces have also openly flown the flag of the Russian Empire during the war in Ukraine, also after the escalation of the war by Russia on February 24, 2022.

 

Finnish Russians, “airsoft” and networks

“One picture on his VK page attracts attention. In it, Pavel is standing in a gun suit, holding a weapon that looks like an assault rifle.

‘It's airsoft’, says Pavel”. Quote from the article “On the Russian side” (Fin. Venäjän puolella) published in Helsingin Sanomat on June 27, 2023. (9) In the composite photo below, two Russians living in Finland at these “airsoft” exercises, which they say they attended. Many of the participants in the exercises have marks on their equipment or clothes that refer to their place of residence, etc. Russians living in Finland have marks that combine the Finnish and Russian flags. In addition to Russian flags or Russian troop unit insignia, the photos they published also show individual Estonian flags, among other things.

Based on the symbols, it can be concluded that these “airsoft” exercises or competitions are multinational, as I refer to in my blog published on July 8, “Those ‘ordinary Russians’ living in Finland: joining to Armed Forces of Russia”, the pictures seem to have been taken somewhere other than Finland. When comparing the pictures published by Russians living in Finland with the pictures found on the social media accounts of people who can be connected to the Russian Imperial Movement or other Russian extremist groups, certain commonalities can be found considerably, based on which I dare to conclude that the pictures published by Russians living in Finland were most likely taken in St. Petersburg or the Leningrad region in Russia. There is a vanishingly small possibility that some of the photos they published, in which there are multinational people, were taken, for example, in the eastern parts of Estonia, but I consider this option very unlikely.

My conclusion is also supported by the fact that several Russians (or persons with Russian background) living in Finland have direct contacts through social media with persons in Russia who belong to the paramilitary forces of extremist groups or have a contractual relationship with companies offering mercenary services. To give a few examples, Anton Kuznetsoff, who fought in Donbas as a volunteer, has contacts based on social media with persons of Russian background living in Finland. These contacts who live in Finland, have delivered at least material aid to Donbas during the war that started in 2014, or they have participated in “airsoft” exercises or competitions in a destination that seems to be somewhere other than in Finland. Kuznetsoff also belongs to the Imperial Legion, the military wing of the Russian Imperial Movement.

Like Kuznetsoff, the extensive network of Aleksandr Ptits, who is from St. Petersburg, includes people who have (or had) connections to Finland. This group also included Petri Viljakainen, who joined the Russian-led volunteer forces in 2015 through Finnish Johan Bäckman. (10) According to the information, Viljakainen has died in the war after the escalation carried out by Russia on February 24, 2022. However, Viljakainen’s death has not been confirmed by official documents in Finland. Based on social media, Ptits seems to have taken part in the war in Ukraine in the Russian forces, besides which he has been actively involved in various paramilitary activities in Russia (in St. Petersburg and/or the Leningrad region) – possibly as a military instructor.

Since St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region are located close to Finland, the region forms a kind of hub, from which there are many other people in the region who have close connections with Russians living in Finland, whose hobbies seem to include “airsoft” or other military activities. Contacts to Finland can also be found in extremist Ruslan Pseuch, who attacked a member of the Russian “solidarity movement” in St. Petersburg in the summer of 2014. However, Pseuch was not imprisoned for his act, but was allowed to enlist in the Russian volunteers fighting in the Luhansk region.

An interesting pattern can be found in the background of Vladimir S, who lives in Finland. He poses very openly in pictures, armed as well as with members of the Night Wolves motorcycle gang, which is a supporter of Vladimir Putin’s regime, and conducted several hybrid operations in Europe for the Putin administration. There are also several people on his social network who seem to have direct connections to Russian paramilitary organizations or groups. Vladimir S also seems to have met Aleksandr Zaldostanov, the leader of the Night Wolves, and Jeff Monson, an American MMA fighter who moved to Russia. The meeting place would seem to be the Russian-occupied, summer Crimean peninsula. We know that the Night Wolves have organized a propaganda show in August on the occupied peninsula for several years. (11)

Based on my observations, for many Russians living in Finland, airsoft seems to be a significant reason for traveling between Finland and Russia. Based on pictures of social media and other observations, many people also find Russian imperialism and expansionism attractive, some even seem to like the Soviet era with hammer and sickle flags. Soviet times, even though some of those who are deep in Soviet nostalgia were not even born in the Soviet Union, but in Russia!

In the article published in Helsingin Sanomat, one Russian living in Finland comes to the fore – Pavel (i.e. Pavel N), who, along with “airsoft” training, according to Ukrainian information, has participated in the war in the Russian volunteer forces at the beginning of the war that started in Ukraine in 2014. According to his own words, he only delivered humanitarian aid to Eastern Ukraine. (12) While researching the social media accounts of Russians living in Finland, I notice that, in addition to Pavel, other persons of Russian background who declare their place of residence in Finland have at least delivered material aid to the war zone in Eastern Ukraine during the war that started in 2014. More precisely, to the territories occupied by Russia. With a very high probability, they have delivered cargoes of material to the region via Russia (committing at least a Ukrainian state border crime, possibly much more). “Cure Morozov”, who declares Turku as his hometown, belongs to this group of Russians living in Finland. He also has contacts with Russian extremists, based on the pictures he has published, he also seems to be fascinated by Third Reich Germany, and hammer and sickle!

 

We also remember how Johan Bäckman openly stated in his blog that he had delivered material from Finland (including various equipment needed for warfare) to the Russian-led volunteers in Donbas, Ukraine. (13) He also did this alongside the recruiting activities he carried out. In Finland, Bäckman’s networks also included people of Russian background at that time.

One of the pictures published from Donbas featured a Russian propagandist who was introduced as the Russian patriot “Jelena”. Sometimes Bäckman described her as the “Jelena of Donbas” or “the beautiful Jelena of Donbas”. It should also be noted that “Jelena” also did not go to the front in January, even though Bäckman claims so in his blog.

Denying things and lying

At the end of my writing, I return to the articles published in Ilta-Sanomat, the focus of which was a man of Russian background living in Finland, who was suspected of being a mercenary in PMC Wagner and who was listened to by the National Bureau of Investigation as a witness in the investigation into the downing of Malaysia Airlines MH17. (14 and 15)

In an interview with Ilta-Sanomat, the man denies that he belonged to PMC Wagner:

“I haven’t been to Wagner, and I don’t even know if Wagner still existed when those pictures were taken. Then there was talk of volunteers or a Slavic army”. (16)

It is known that in the middle of 2014, numerous detachments of Russian volunteers were assembled in Donbas, but from spring 2014 onwards, detachments of mercenaries were also sent to the region from Russia, among which was also PMC Wagner. The war in Donbas, which started in the spring of 2014, was PMC Wagner’s first visible operation, its predecessor organization operated in Syria under the name Slavonic Corps.

Between 2013 and 2015, among the Russian mercenary organizations there was also a group that appeared under the name Slav Corps, as well as troops made up of Cossack volunteers. These volunteers and mercenaries fought in Syria from 2013 onwards and from spring 2014 onwards in Ukraine, Donbas. In addition to military operations in eastern Ukraine, Russia also relied on these forces in the occupied Crimean peninsula to maintain “internal security”. In practice, these militants participated in terrorizing and harassing opponents of the Russian occupation.

n the articles, I drew attention to the fact that the Russian man in question (remained anonymous) also first denied that he had participated in combat missions, stating that he had given patriotic training to Russian youth in Russia on handling various weapons, until finally admitting that he had been there as a “voluntary protector” in several combat situations. (17) He refers to the protection of Christians and the protection of children and the elderly from bombing. Especially the reference to giving “patriotic education” to the children raised some thoughts in my mind. Namely, the militaristic training of children and young people in the areas occupied by Russia from Ukraine started in some parts as early as 2015, i.e., long before the militaristic training of children and young people practiced in Russia came to the fore in the Western media with the establishment of Yunarmiya.

After Russia occupied the Crimean peninsula and parts of Donbas, Ukrainian children and youth from the regions have also been transferred to Russia to receive “patriotic education”. These children and teens were often taken to training and education camps by force, without the consent of the children’s parents. As far as I understand, such forced transfers of children and teens (minors) are war crimes. How to relate to a person who has participated in the implementation of such actions in one way or another? Can he shirk responsibility by stating that he only obeyed orders or by saying “I didn't know where they came from”?

I am tired of the endless denial of things by these Russians or Finnish supporters of Russia. They are all innocent, that they only provided humanitarian aid or helped children and the elderly, or they justify their actions like Pavel – if it is not forbidden, it is allowed, as he stated according to an article published in Helsingin Sanomat: “Is it forbidden? If it is not forbidden, it is permissible”. (18)

And that concludes with a few questions. At this point, many are probably rightfully wondering why such a group lives in Finland? What are they doing here? Do they pose a security threat to Finland? The last question will be answered on my behalf by Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, Chair of the Defense Committee of the German Parliament –

“Such people with real war experience – who possibly killed others without remorse – are dangerous to our society”. (19)

* * *

My original writing ended here, but due to the – still ongoing – episode related to Yan Petrovsky, it is worth writing a few more short paragraphs. It is puzzling that a person like Petrovsky managed to pass the checks and enter our country at least twice and stay here for long periods of time – this alone shows that all our authorities are not really doing their job with the necessary seriousness! The claim of the immigration authorities that they know who comes here and to whom a residence permit is granted is definitely not true. A known war criminal, mercenary and founder of a mercenary organization, should have been caught earlier!

It is impossible for me to believe that the story they (Petrovsky and his wife) concocted, that they came to Finland because they want to raise their children in the West but be close to Russia, is the whole truth. It may be a partial truth, but it is foolish to imagine that it is the whole truth! Petrovsky has contacts with the neo-Nazi Nordic Resistance Movement and the far-right Soldiers of Odin – as well as extremist Russians living in the Nordic countries. Too many coincidences considering the time! Infiltrating the West under the guise of a new name (Voislav Torden), utilizing contacts and existing networks – what Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann stated about the danger of such persons to our community?

And finally, Petrovsky’s trial in Finland could lead us to the trail of yet another educated and considered exemplary Russian. After a little digging, a person who accuses Finns of being Russophobes seems to be revealed under the “pure shell” of Petrovsky’s legal assistant Natalia Malgina, who is like a model example of a liberal educated Russian who is unable to critically evaluate Russia and through it herself. (20) These times truly reveal to us the “Russian soul”!

 

Marko

 

Sources:

*: https://yle.fi/a/74-20047129 

1. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-white-supremacist-terrorism-us/2020/04/11/255a9762-7a75-11ea-a311-adb1344719a9_story.html 

2. https://uawire.org/russian-mercenary-who-fought-in-donbas-killed-in-libya 

3. https://www.expressen.se/gt/militarutbildades-i-ryssland-precis-fore-bombdaden/ 

4. https://www.focus.de/politik/ausland/rechtsextreme-lager-deutsche-neonazis-ueben-terrorkampf-in-sankt-petersburg_id_12067019.html 

5. https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/russian-imperial-movement-rim/report 

6. https://www.counterextremism.com/threat/russian-imperial-movement-rim/report 

7. http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2015/09/russian-fascist-militants-give-money-to.html 

8. https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009701271.html 

9. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html 

10. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html 

11. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1JTaLq1F_ek 

12. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html 

13. https://kohudosentti.blogspot.com/2014/12/dnr-taistelee-suomalaisissa.html 

14. https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009701271.html 

15. https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009701250.html 

16. https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009701250.html 

17. https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009701250.html 

18. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html 

19. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html 

20. https://telegra.ph/Bez-tormozov-kak-finny-unizhayut-i-vygonyayut-iz-strany-russkih-07-04 

My blog about Natalia Malgina (in Finnish):

https://vartiopaikalla.blogspot.com/2023/08/sotarikollinen-jan-petrovskin.html 

My blog “Suomi ensin – Putinin asialla” (published 7/2017) contains a few observations about Finland related to the topic of this blog.

Finnish-Russians, weapons and participation in criminal war, supporting imperialism and distorting history.

Those “ordinary Russians” living in Finland: joining to Armed Forces of Russia

This text is based on my Finnish-language blog “Those ‘ordinary Russians’ fighting in the Armed Forces of Russia” (Fin. Ne ”tavalliset venäläiset” sotimassa Venäjän riveissä), which I published on July 8, 2023. For readers’ information, I have added more individual pictures to the blog. You should also note that some of the Russians living in Finland I mentioned in the blog have lived in our country for years or even decades. So, their enlistment as mercenaries or their support of Russian warfare cannot therefore be explained by the fact that they had only lived in Finland for a short time. Due to the Finnish Criminal Code, I have covered the faces of some of the pictures. Persons whose faces are covered live permanently in Finland.

 

Those “ordinary Russians” living in Finland: joining to Armed Forces of Russia

Over the years, I have made observations and written them down in the form of blogs about Finns fighting in Russia’s proxy forces or Russian subordinate forces in Eastern Ukraine; equally, I have observed the participation of Finns and Russians living in Finland in anti-Ukraine campaigning and information warfare in Finland and other countries. Part of this kind of campaigning can be considered a hybrid influence aimed at Finland – in practice a hybrid war, because for Russia it’s all about warfare, not hybrid influence. We Finns just scorn the name hybrid war, perhaps because in our mind’s warfare has a more concrete purpose meaning “blood and guts.”

In this blog, my attention is focused especially on Russians living in Finland who enlist in the Russian forces in Ukraine or support Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, some have been doing this since 2014, when the war in Donbas began.

Photo collage of Finns and Russians living in Finland working for Russia.

On June 27, 2023, Helsingin Sanomat published a background article “On Russia’s side” (Venäjän puolella), in which the journalists examined the hidden network of foreign fighters who fought in the Armed Forces of Russia in Eastern Ukraine. Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, chairwoman of the German Parliament’s defense committee, said the following about the network in question:

“Such people with real war experience - who possibly killed others without remorse - are dangerous to our society.” (1)

With the article, I decided to write a blog about my own observations about Russians living in Finland (or people who speak Russian and living in Finland) who have participated in the war with the Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine in one way or another. This group also includes Russians who lived in Finland and have returned to Russia after February 24, 2022, to participate in Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine.

However, at the beginning of my writing, a brief review of the involvement of Russians or pro-Russians living in Finland in activities supporting Russia and influence in Finland, after Russia’s occupation of the Crimean Peninsula (February-March 2014) and the war started in Eastern Ukraine in April 2014. Their activity has been so long-term, and it has involved so much various levels of activism that this review only includes some key points and noteworthy events (with sources and background text links).

One of the most significant branches of this activity, influence and activism that includes targeted harassment is the result of an article written by Yleisradio journalist Jessikka Aro about the Russian troll factory. (2) Mainly Finns participated in the widespread harassment (it was practically psychological violence), but in which e.g., Johan Bäckman use of his contacts in Russia building it up. He also used various Russian media for a smear campaign against journalist Aro. I recommend everyone to read the non-fiction book ‘Putinin trollit – Tositarinoita Venäjän infosodan rintamilta’ of Russia’s information war written by Jessikka Aro and translated into several languages.

For years, attention in Finland was paid only to information influencing and propagandistic communication carried out by Russia and the Russians living in our country. Involvement in other activism and possible hybrid warfare operations emerged more broadly in connection with investigations related to special real estate deals and construction projects. But even then, Finland was careful not to talk about Russia’s possible hybrid operations or preparations for some Gray area activity. In her book ‘Putinin pihapiirissä,’ Tuula Malin brings up vague business acquaintances along with numerous shady real estate transactions. Despite this, e.g., in the case of Airisto’s pearl (Airiston Helmi), the official communications in Finland spoke of financial crime, while in Latvia, on the other hand, in the case of the same oligarch – Pavel Melnikov – there was essentially a more direct reference to possible security threats that the person’s holdings in the country create. (3)

The support of the Russian administration’s politics and imperialist wars of conquest was best seen in Finland precisely in the field of information influence and propaganda war. After Russia occupied the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in February-March 2014, activities supporting Russia began to be organized more widely in Finland, by Finns who support the Russian regime and Russians living in Finland. In the beginning, their public activities were oriented towards events that received media coverage. At that time, the attitude of the Finnish media to the events was childishly naive, some journalists even seemed to believe the propaganda stories about “separatism” in Donbas and “persecuting the Russians.” The later events were clearly more propagandistic, which the Finnish media could take a more critical view of.

In addition to the organization of various events and occasions, association activities played a more visible role, in which Finns and persons of Russian background living in Finland – or persons who declared themselves Russian in the armed forces – actively participated. Among the prominent associations, the DNR-edustamiskeskus ry ( appeared as the official representative of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” in Finland. Naturally, it didn’t really have that role, even though the people behind the operation claimed so. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland had to correct the disinformation spread by the association. (4)

DNR-edustamiskeskus ry and Donetskin kansantasavallan ystävät Suomessa organized a few Christmas parties, which were attended not only by Finns but also by Russians living in Finland. At least once among the guests was also Natalia Nikonorova from the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine. At that time, Nikonorova appeared at the event in the role of “Foreign Minister,” which role she had in the puppet administration appointed by the Kremlin. In the first years of its activity, DNR-edustamiskeskus ry was highly active as a spreader of propaganda and disinformation. Propaganda material from Russia and the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine was also brought to Finland through it. In the last years of visible activism, among the collaborators of DNR-edustamiskeskus ry was also RUFI – suomalais-venäläinen yhdistys ry, which supported the imperialist policy of the Russian government, and was headed by Daria Skippari-Smirnov at the time.

Under Skippari-Smirnov’s leadership, the first Immortal Regiment March was organized in Finland in May 2017. (5) After this, Skippari-Smirnov has organized two more Immortal Regiment marches in the name of RUFI and, after the corona pandemic, in May 2022, a car march that ended in Helsinki. During the active years, a lot of disinformation and pro-Russia propaganda was shared on the association’s social media platforms and website. Under the leadership of Skippari-Smirnov, the association also played a prominent role in the journey to the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula in the spring of 2018.

Johan Bäckman’s recruitment of fighters to the Russian proxy forces in Eastern Ukraine (especially in 2015 and 2016), and the delivery of various materials to the war zone in Eastern Ukraine through Russia, played its part in the activities in Finland. People of Russian background living in Finland and the companies they own also have part of this activity. (6)

I have previously written several blogs on the subject, the most recent one in December 2021. In recent years, the Finnish media have also more actively examined such activities and direct participation in hostilities in the Armed Forces of Russia – this was also the case in the extensive article published in Helsingin Sanomat and the articles published in Yleisradio in autumn and winter 2021. (7 and 8) In my blogs, I have focused mainly on the recruitment of fighters of Finnish background. But this time I am focusing on the participation of people of Russian background living in Finland in the war in Eastern Ukraine and specifically in the Armed Forces of Russia. Helsingin Sanomat’s article on ‘Venäjän puolella’ offers an excellent basis from which to proceed.

 

Onko tšuhna nenästä vedettävä – Are we Finns idiots, in Russian tšuhna is a derogatory term used for Finns

After the introduction, we can then move on to the matter itself, i.e., to examine the participation of persons of Russian background living in Finland in the Russian Army in the war in Ukraine. In my writing, however, I ignore the examination of the mercenary army connected to Gennadi Timchenko, which has recently caused a lot of buzz in Finland as well. (9) The reason for sidelining the topic is simple. A closer look at the mercenary army, or Redut, connected to Timchenko would make this article far too long. But the fact that before this year no attention was paid in Finland to Timchenko’s ownership of Redut, speaks volumes about the secrecy that has prevailed around Gennadi Timchenko on a wider scale. Note Timchenko also has Finnish citizenship!

In Finland, the idea that Vladimir Putin’s political opponents in Russia would automatically oppose the war (or the so-called special operation) has been pampered for a very long time. However, such a belief is completely wrong! In May 2023, Sergei Porohovoi, an activist of The Other Russia of E. V. Limonov party who lived in Finland for more than a decade, returned to Russia of his own free will, announcing that he was ready to join the forces of the Interbrigady movement operating in the Russian-occupied Donbas region as a volunteer. Interbrigady movement have been fighting against Ukraine as part of Russian forces in eastern Ukraine since 2014. The forces in question are suspected of having committed war crimes in the war zone of eastern Ukraine. According to an activist source known to Porohovoi, Porohovoi decided to return to Russia, after life in Finland became mentally impossible due to Ukraine frenzy and Russophobia. (10)

In The Other Russia of E. V. Limonov party, founded by Eduard Limonov, extreme leftism and fascism were combined into a national Bolshevik ideology. National Bolshevism is a political movement that combines nationalism and Bolshevism. The ideological anti-Americanism is also significant for the movement. The original goal of The Other Russia of E. V. Limonov party has been, among other things, referendums in Russian-majority areas in Russia’s border neighbours on joining Russia. Today, Russia has become radicalized to such an extent that National Bolshevism is not much different from the “ideology” in power in Russia, where Putinism and fascism have combined to form Russism. Now we must ask ourselves whether we have been a little too naive when it comes to Putin’s political opponents and our attitude towards them.

Porohovoi was one of Putin’s ideological opponents, but he has returned to Russia and is ready to participate in Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine, but how many ‘porohovoi’s’ have we raised on our knees?

In Helsingin Sanomat’s article on ”Venäjän puolella,” comments are asked from a Russian living in Finland, Pavel i.e., Pavel N, about his participation in the war with Russia against Ukraine. Pavel, like many others, acknowledges that he was on a humanitarian mission and did not participate in the fighting. The same was claimed by British citizen Benjamin Stimson, who years ago in Great Britain was sentenced to several years in prison for participating in the war in Russian proxy forces against the Ukrainian government. (11) Stimson, like Pavel, has appeared in pictures with an assault rifle in a war zone, which was enough for Stimson to be sentenced.

In the Helsingin Sanomat article, a picture of Pavel holding a weapon that looks like an assault rifle has been picked up. According to Pavel, it is a weapon used in airsoft. A couple of active reservists gave me a reasoned dissenting opinion, so it may or may not be an airsoft gun. On the social media of Pavel’s friends, you can find more interesting pictures in which Pavel N. also appears – in some of the pictures, armed.

Some of the pictures in which Pavel N. and his friends appear were probably taken in connection with airsoft, but the activity and training seen in some of the pictures reminds me of something other than airsoft. Based on the dilapidated buildings visible in the photos, they were taken somewhere other than Finland. Based on the names of the people in the photos, I would conclude that they were taken either around St. Petersburg in Russia or possibly in the eastern parts of Estonia.*

Pavel N., partial image of the original image.

“Airsoft” training “out there somewhere.”

A picture of the area where Russians living in Finland also go to practice “airsoft.” Location likely near St. Petersburg, Russia. 

The pictures inevitably remind me of the pictures from years ago that were published from the Partizan camps organized by the Russian Imperial Movement or from the camps of the Evraziyskiy Soyuz molodezhi i.e. ESM, which were attended by teens and a young adult from the eastern parts of Ukraine years before the war started by Russia in 2014. (12 and 13) ESM’s ideological “youth camps” were events where Eurasianism (or neo-Eurasianism) was spread to Russia's neighbouring countries through the networks created. Along with Evraziyskiy Soyuz molodezhi, similar activities were also carried out through Mezhdunarodnoe Evraziyskoe Dvizhenie, both based on the ideas of Aleksandr Dugin.

When browsing the social media network of Pavel N and his friends, there are also other persons of Russian background who declare their place of residence in Finland, who have delivered material aid at least since 2014 to the war zone of eastern Ukraine, more precisely, to the areas occupied by Russia. This means that, with a very high probability, they have driven to the area via Russia (at the very least guilty of the Ukrainian state border crime, at the most a lot more). “Cure Morozov,” who claims to be based in Turku, has published a picture on social media which are taken in frontline conditions, along with aid pictures.

Despite the international verdict and Russia's extensive war crimes, February 24, 2022, has not formed a limit to Russian support for Russia by Russians living in Finland or pro-Russian Finns. As can be seen from the Helsingin Sanomat article, Pavel N has been sharing PMC Wagner’s recruitment ads on social media since February 24, 2022, but has gone even further. I know of at least one case where a man of Russian background who moved to Finland a few years ago (before the corona pandemic) – Yevgeni K – has returned to Russia to participate in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Yevgeni K’s background is so interesting that you would think it would also arouse our authorities. According to reliable information, before moving to Finland, he worked in Russia in special forces under the Ministry of the Interior in St. Petersburg and/or the Leningrad region, rising to the rank of officer. He moved to Finland after his service contract ended. Those who know him suspect (justifiably) that Yevgeni K hid his true work history and background when he arrived in Finland.

It can at least be stated that, so far, the actions of our authorities regarding the investigation of the actions of those who fought in the Russian forces have been quite lax. Coincidentally, just today Ilta-Sanomat published an extensive article that talked about the long-running investigation by the Häme police and The National Bureau of Investigation, the target of which is a Russian man living in Finland, who, according to Ukrainian sources, has fought in the PMC Wagner owned by Yevgeni Prigozhin. (14) It is noteworthy that the man was treated as a possible witness in the chain of events related to the shot down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17.

Image from the Ilta-Sanomat article, July 8, 2023.

It is interesting that Suojelupoliisi – Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (Supo) has not publicly paid attention to the Finnish foreign fighters who fought in the forces of Russia in Eastern Ukraine. Instead, in his national terrorism threat assessment published this spring, Supo warns about individual extremists who have traveled to fight on the other side, i.e., with the Ukrainian forces. A journalist from Helsingin Sanomat asked Supo what they think about those Finns who have participated in the war in Donbas on the Russian side – “Does Supo consider them a security threat? What kind of security risk can they cause when they return to Finland?” (15) Supo’s answer was that they have nothing to comment on. Instead, according to researcher Kacper Rekawek, who specializes in foreign fighters who fought in Ukraine, foreign fighters who have returned to their home countries and fought in the ranks of Russia are especially now a security threat – “In practice, they are Russian agents.” (16)

The same evasion on the part of our authorities was already noticeable years ago, when I made a request for an investigation into the activities of Johan Bäckman and Janus Putkonen. I covered the case in more detail in my blog on December 4, 2021. For those who can’t read the blog, I state that the National Prosecution Authority decided that there is no reason for a preliminary investigation. I was hoping that tšuhna has caught on since then, but I’m afraid I’m wrong. The Russians are still laughing at the naive tšuhna!

 

Marko

 

Sources:

1. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html  (Behind paywall). 

2. https://kioski.yle.fi/omat/kioski-pietarin-trollitehtaalla 

3. https://ir.lv/2018/11/30/russias-hand/ 

4. https://vartiopaikalla.blogspot.com/2017/12/kaiken-takana-on-backman.html 

5. https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/a/venalaisten-yhdistys-tuomassa-voitonpaivan-kuolemattoman-rykmentin-marssia-suomeen-64692/#194c9420 

6. https://vartiopaikalla.blogspot.com/2019/03/kalastelua-johan-backmanin-verkoilla.html 

7. https://yle.fi/a/3-12153718 

8. https://yle.fi/a/3-12210484 

9. https://www.iltalehti.fi/ulkomaat/a/ccc85850-6026-4ef4-9b2a-2e673a603fef 

10. https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009578041.html 

11. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/british-man-prorussian-forces-ukraine-jailed-terrorism-benjamin-stimson-a7842521.html 

12. https://m.vk.com/partizan_kurs 

13. http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2016/01/how-alexander-dugins-neo-eurasianists.html 

14. https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009701271.html 

15. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html 

16. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html 

*: When analyzing the networks of people of Russian background living in Finland, it is also revealed that at least some of them have connections with the Russian imperialist Russian Imperial Movement, or RIM, headquartered in St. Petersburg. As well as to members of RIM who have fought in the Russian forces in eastern Ukraine.

RIM organizes military training for various groups in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region. The courses organized by it have also been attended by members of the Nordic Resistance Movement. I would not consider it impossible that Russians living in Finland would go to RIM’s camps to train. Yes, maybe at these camps they practice that “airsoft”!

Note – In the near future, I will translate the continuation of this blog into English, where I will be more specific about the connections of Russians living in Finland to Russian extremists, such as the Russian Imperial Movement.

#StandWithUkraine 

”Tavallisen venäläisen” toive: Median pitäisi lännessä kertoa Ukrainan sodasta myös Venäjän näkökulma

 

Siitä hetkestä lähtien, kun Venäjä laajensi sotaansa Ukrainassa helmikuussa 2022, meitä muistutettiin toistuvasti siitä, kuinka kyseessä on Vladimir Putinin sota – Venäjän johdon sota Ukrainaa vastaan. Venäläisten paetessa mobilisointiuhan alla naapurimaihinsa ja niiden kautta vieläkin kauemmas turvaan valtiokoneiston toteuttamalta mobilisoinnilta, väitettiin meille Vladimir Putinin ja sodan vastustajien pakenevan sotaa ja uhkaavaa rintamalle joutumista kotimaastaan. Väitteessä piti paikkansa korkeintaan sentään se, että nämä ihmiset – pääasiassa nuoremmat miehet – pakenivat sitä, etteivät joutuisi rintamalle. Huomioimatta jäi se, etteivät nämä ”rintamakarkurit” välttämättä olleet Vladimir Putinin hallinnon tai edes sodan vastustajia. Todellisuudessa nämä Venäjältä paenneet eivät olleet valmiit uhraamaan omaa henkeään epäonnistuneen ”erikoisoperaation” tähden. Epäilen kuitenkin, että tavattoman moni tästä suuresta joukosta oli mieluusti nauttinut Venäjän hallinnon suomista eduista – ehkäpä jopa rikastuneetkin jonkin verran. He olivat kenties humaltuneet Krimin niemimaan miehittämisen nostattamasta kansallishuumasta ja tunteneet ylpeyttä siitä, ettei Venäjää enää nöyryytetty. He eivät piitanneet siitä, että tuhansittain venäläisiä oli jo kuollut sodassa, jota Venäjä oli käynyt Itä-Ukrainassa keväästä 2014 lähtien. He eivät myöskään piitanneet siitä, että maansa oli ajautunut totalitarismiin – heille riitti, että rahaa tuli, ulkomaille pääsi ja Moskovasta tahi Pietarista löysi ulkomaisia luksustuotteita. Mitä siitä, että suurin osa venäläisistä saattoi vain haaveilla moisista, että miljoonilla venäläisillä ei ollut edes sisävessaa ja juoksevaa vettä. Niin, olivatko he vain syyttömiä sivullisia uhreja, jotka brutaali hallinto yritti lähettää teuraaksi kuin lampaat vai olivatko he ratas koneistossa, joka mahdollisti Putinin hallinnon jatkumisen ja kehittymisen entistä totalitaarisempaan suuntaan?

Entäpä olimmeko täällä lännessä hiukan naiiveja päästäessämme heidät Venäjältä, samalla kun maalailimme heistä kuvajaista, jonka sokea reettakin näki olevan falski valhe?

Kirjoituksessani en vastaa suoraan edellä esittämiini kysymyksiin, mutta uskoisin, että tekstistäni käy ilmi mitä mieltä olen venäläisten (kansalaiset) syyttömyydestä tahi syyllisyydestä kuin myös siitä, mitä mieltä olen päättäjiemme reaktioista ja toimista täällä lännessä.

Luonnollisesti yli 140 miljoonan asukkaan kansaan mahtuu lukuisia eri mielipiteitä, on ihmisiä, jotka vastustavat sotaa – syystä tai toisesta, kuten on myös heitä, jotka kannattavat sotaa. Tämän kirjoituksen kannalta ei ole merkitsevää se, mikä on syy esim. sodan vastustamiselle. Mielestäni sen perusteella kannattaako henkilö Venäjällä sotaa vai vastustaako hän sitä, ei voida suoraan päätellä sitä, tukeeko hän Vladimir Putinin hallintoa vaiko ei; kuten ei sitäkään, millaisena hän näkee Venäjän tulevaisuuden.

Venäjällä on runsaasti erilaisia Venäjän imperialismia tukevia ja väkivaltaan turvautuvia ryhmiä, jotka suhtautuvat Venäjän hallintoon vieroksuen – jopa kielteisesti. Toisaalta Vladimir Putinin hallinto on sietänyt lukuisia ekstremistisiä ryhmiä, kuten Russian Imperial Movement’ia, koska hallinto on kyennyt käyttämään niitä oman politiikkansa edistämiseen Venäjällä ja maan rajojen ulkopuolella. Näitä ryhmiä on myös siedetty Venäjällä, niin kauan kun ne eivät toiminnallaan uhkaa Putinin hallintoa. Kyse on eräänlaisesta yhteiskuntasopimuksesta, mutta mikään ei takaa sitä, että Venäjän hallinto noudattaa tällaisia (hiljaisia) yhteiskuntasopimuksia. Laajalla hyökkäyssodalla Ukrainaan Kreml rikkoi yhden tällaisen ns. sopimuksen Venäjän keskiluokan kanssa.

Meillä lännessä on myös hiukan idealistinen kuva eräistä venäläisistä oppositiopoliitikoista, johtuen luonnollisesti siitä, että nämä poliitikot tukiryhmineen – kuten Aleksei Navalnyi tukijoineen – ovat joutuneet hallinnon hampaisiin, näiden poliitikkojen henkeä on uhattu ja toimintaan osallistuvia vainottu. Ei siis ihme, että me näemme näiden poliitikkojen tukijoineen seisovan samassa joukossa meidän kanssa. Tässä kohdin olemme ehkäpä hiukan liian naiiveja kuvitellessamme, ettei meidän ja heidän välillä voi olla mitään ristiriitoja. Edellisellä en missään nimessä tarkoita sitä, mihin usein on vedottu, kun Putinia ei haluttu arvostella ja ryhtyä hänen edessä poikkiteloin – ”vaikka Vladimir Putin on autoritaarinen, niin seuraajansa voi olla vieläkin pahempi”. Ei! Tarkoitan sitä, että tilanne Venäjällä ei ole niin yksinkertainen kuin kuvittelemme, johtuen osaltaan siitä, että Vladimir Putin hallintoineen on myrkyttänyt Venäjää ja venäläisten mieliä jo yli parin vuosikymmenen ajan, kuin myös siitä, etteivät venäläiset ole oikeasti kohdanneet historiaansa ja käyneet läpi imperialistista menneisyyttään. Edelleen miljoonat venäläiset, olivatpa he Vladimir Putinista mitä mieltä tahansa, näkevät ja kokevat Venäjän olevan suuremman kuin sen nykyiset maantieteelliset rajat. Tällaista ajattelua ilmenee myös ulkovenäläisissä, mikä nyt purskahtelee pintaan öykkärimäisenä käyttäytymisenä tai loputtomana uhriutumisena, jossa venäläiset nähdään uhreina, joita länsi kohtelee kaltoin. Heiltä puuttuu kyky arvioida kriittisesti omien tekemistensä ohella myös hallintonsa tekemisiä! Mikä näkyy myös siinä, ettei kanneta vastuuta omista tekemistä, itse asiassa moni venäläinen ei edes kykene hahmottamaan tekojensa seurauksia! Vetäytyminen vastuusta, toteamalla ”ettei ole poliittinen henkilö” ei enää riitä. Hiljaisuuskin on teko, valinta, jota edeltää päätös olla hiljaa! Kantaaottamattomuus on siis valinta, kannanotto!

Entinen kiekkosuuruus Aleksandr Barkov senior ei pääse luistelemaan vastuusta toteamuksellaan, jonka hän lausui Ilta-Sanomien haastattelussa tammikuun 1. päivänä.

”Mitä ajattelet Venäjän hyökkäyssodasta Ukrainaan?

– En halua mennä hirveän syvälle, mutta vastustan kaikkia sotia, mitä maailmassa tapahtuu, hän sanoo ja pysähtyy.

- - -

Barkov ei koe, että hänellä olisi asiantuntemusta arvioida maailmanpolitiikkaa, mutta murheissaan hän selvästi on.

– Kyllä se on huono juttu. Haluan maailmalle parasta. On poliitikkojen tehtävä ratkaista nämä asiat.” (1)

Barkoviahan ei pyydetty ottamaan kantaa maailmanpolitiikkaan, vaan kertomaan mielipide rikollisesta hyökkäyssodasta, jossa Venäjä pommittaa siviilikohteita, ja jossa sen sotilaat kiduttavat ja murhaavat ukrainalaisia. Jos Aleksandr Barkov on mieluummin hiljaa kuin ottaa kantaa, niin lappeenrantalainen – venäläistaustainen – kunnallispoliitikko Ekaterina ’Katja’ Marova (vasemmistoliitto) ei tyydy pelkästään olemaan hiljaa vaan toistaa kannanotoissaan Venäjän narratiivia, toivoessaan tiedotusvälineiltä uutisia, joissa kerrottaisiin myös Venäjän näkemyksiä sodan taustoista, kuten Naton laajentumisen pelosta. (2) Tällaisen toivomuksen taustalla täytyy olla, ainakin jollain tasolla, usko siitä, että Venäjän irrationaalinen pelko Naton hyökkäyksestä Venäjälle on paikkansa pitävä.

Siinä vaiheessa, kun Ekaterina Marova peukuttaa satasella someviestille, jossa epäillään, etteivät venäläiset olisikaan syyllisiä Butšan verilöylyyn viime vuonna, niin on jo astuttu sovinnaisuuden rajan yli. Butša vapautettiin maalis-huhtikuussa 2022, hetkenä, jolloin Marova kommentoi peukuttamalla todisteet Venäjän syyllisyydestä olivat murskaavat. Kyse ei ollut enää yksittäisistä siviiliuhreista – sodankäynnin synnyttämistä kuolemista – vaan joukkoteloituksista, vankien murhista, sotarikosepäilyistä jne. Marova vahvistaa narratiivia Butšan lavastuksesta, sen sijaan Valta kuuluu kansalle kansanedustajaehdokkaanakin ollut, venäläistaustainen, Sofia Kazakov levittää avoimesti Venäjän propagandaa.

Venäjän narratiivi toistuu näissä Suomessa asuvien venäläistaustaisten vaikuttajien viesteissä.

Ja kuten lukijani saattoivat huomata, kirjoitukseni otsikon ”tavallinen venäläinen” on Suomessa asuva venäläistaustainen henkilö, joka on elänyt läntisen median viestien kyllästämässä maailmassa mutta silti hänen toiveista kuultaa läpi Kremlin narratiivi. Ehkäpä aiheellista myös kysyä, että mitä meillä Suomessa on tehty väärin? Ja ovatko suomalaismediat tarjonneet Marovan lailla ajatteleville venäläisille riittävästi ajantasaista tietoa ja haastaneet heidät tarkastelemaan tapahtumia kriittisesti?*

Minulle Marovan lailla ajatteleva Suomessa asuva venäläinen ei tule yllätyksenä. Näennäisesti he ovat kotoutuneet Suomeen, mutta heidän henkinen koti ei ole Suomessa. He eivät välttämättä hae tietoa suomalaisista (läntisistä) medioista, monen sulkiessa silmänsä hallintonsa tekemisiltä, koska sen myötä elämä on helpompaa täällä Suomessa. Ja kun tarpeeksi moni tekee näin, niin omalta osaltaan se hiljentää soraääniä (hallinnon vastustajia) lisää. Lopulta merkittävä osa valitsee olla hiljaa ja olla epäpoliittinen henkilö, jolloin pienehkön, äänekkään ja aggressiivisen ryhmän on helpompaa ohjailla kannanottoja, mielipiteitä jne.

Suomessa asuvat venäläiset ovat myös syyllistyneet ukrainalaisten häirintään sekä tarkoituksellisten valheiden levittämiseen, esim. vuosi sitten keväällä terveydenhoitoalalla yrittäjänä työskennellyt venäläistaustainen nainen levitti valheita ukrainalaispakolaisten käyttäytymisestä. (3) Kyseinen Helsingissä yrittäjänä työskentelevä nainen ei todellisuudessa työskennellyt vastaanottokeskuksessa Juuassa, jossa hän väitti työskennelleensä ja kohdanneensa ukrainalaispakolaisia.

Vuosi sitten Suomessa järjestettiin Suomalais-venäläisen RuFi ry:n toimesta autoparaati voitonpäivän kunniaksi. (4) Aiemmin kyseinen yhdistys on järjestänyt Suomessa Kuolemattoman rykmentin marsseja, ensimmäisen toukokuun 9. 2017. Helsingin Sanomien haastattelussa yhdistyksen puheenjohtajaksi yhdistysrekisteriin merkitty Daria Skippari-Smirnov puolusteli Venäjän hyökkäyssodan synnyttämiä siviiliuhreja, levittäen samassa haastattelussa ehtaa Kreml-propagandaa –

”Totta kai kun on sota, pommi saattaa osua jonnekin muuallekin. Siltä ei voi välttyä…”. (5)

Vuodentakaisen autoparaatin edellä suomenvenäläisten WhatsApp-ryhmässä keskusteltiin aseiden tuomisesta autokulkueeseen, samaisessa ryhmässä lietsottiin myös vihaa ukrainalaisia vastaan. (6)

Tietojeni mukaan tänä vuonna Suomessa ei järjestetä Kuolemattoman rykmentin marssia, kuten ei autokulkuettakaan. Toisaalta tässä noudatetaan Kremlin määrittelemää linjaa, Kuolemattoman rykmentin marssien ollessa pannassa Venäjälläkin.

Oma lukunsa Suomessa asuvien venäläisten tai suomenvenäläisten kohdalla on osallistuminen Venäjän Ukrainassa käymään sotaan. Heitä on värväytynyt Venäjän varustamiin vapaaehtoisjoukkoihin vuodesta 2014 lähtien jonkin verran, mutta tiedossani on myös yksittäisiä venäläisiä, jotka ovat palanneet Venäjälle 24. helmikuuta 2022 jälkeen ainoana tarkoituksenaan värväytyminen Venäjän asevoimiin tai muiden turvallisuusorganisaatioiden joukkoihin. Tähän teemaan ja havaintoihin palaan tuonnempana, ennen vuodenloppua kuitenkin.

Kirjoituksessani  olen käsitellyt teemaa – venäläisten kollektiivisesta vastuusta sotaan Ukrainassa – yksilöitävien esimerkkien kautta. Tässä kohdin minun olisi tavattoman helppoa käyttää todisteina mielipidekyselyitä, jotka todistavat Vladimir Putinilla olevan edelleen vankkaa kannatusta Venäjällä, josta voi päätellä sodalla (venäläisittäin siis erikoisoperaatiolla) olevan edelleen vankan kannatuksen maassa. Tämä siitä huolimatta vaikka 24. helmikuuta 2022 jälkeen Venäjä on tapattanut sotilaitaan Ukrainassa kymmenin tuhansin – kaatuneiden ja kuolleiden sekä kadonneiden kokonaismäärän noustessa jo pitkälle yli sadan tuhannen. Tässä tapauksessa näen mielipidekyselyt kaikesta huolimatta toisarvoisena todisteena, vaikka ne todistavatkin suurimman osan venäläisistä seisovan valtiojohtonsa tekojen takana. Sen sijaan henkinen ilmapiiri Venäjällä kuin myös ulkovenäläisten keskuudessa osoittaa sen, että itsetutkiskelua ei ole pahemmin harrastettu kuten ei itsekritiikkiäkään – jota esimerkit Suomestakin omalta osaltaan tukevat.

Sosiaalisen median alustat paljastavat omalla karulla tavallaan sen, kuinka ”tavalliset venäläiset” suhtautuvat maanmiestensä julmuuksiin Ukrainassa. Tällöin on toki huomioitava erilaisissa ryhmissä liikkuvien kommentoijien yksiulotteinen otanta koko kansasta. Miljoonilla venäläisillä ei ole mahdollisuutta päästä säännöllisesti nettiin, toisaalta tämä joukko on pääasiassa Venäjän valtiollisten televisiokanavien viestinnän varassa, joten on enemmän kuin todennäköistä, että he suhtautuvat myötämielisesti sotaan kuin myös ukrainalaisten brutaaliin murhaamiseenkin. Alla kuvakollaasi selityksineen avaamaan venäläisten suhtautumista maanmiestensä Ukrainassa toteuttamiin julmuuksiin. 

Kuvakollaasin esimerkkien kaltaisia viestejä venäläisiltä löytyy telegramista, YouTubesta ja monelta muulta somekanavalta huomattavan paljon. Viestit välittävät kuvan maasta ja kansasta, joka on moraalisesti täysin rappeutunut. Vastaavan kaltaisen Venäjän sotaa, kansanmurhaa, tukevan mutta sisällöltään erilaisen performanssin näimme taannoin Australiassa, jossa paikalliset sekä venäläistaustaiset osoittivat tukea Venäjän sodalle Ukrainassa venäläiskuoron konsertissa sonnustautuessaan Z-paitoihin ja Yrjön nauhoihin. (7) Venäjälle kuin myös venäläisille kulttuuri on edelleen osa vaikuttamiskeinoja, soft power’ia, josta seuraa se, että näennäisen viattomallakin tapahtumalla voi olla piilotettuja tarkoitusperiä tai se on voitu valjastaa osaksi vaikuttamisoperaatiota ilman, että ulkopuolisilla on tästä tietoa. Meidän ei pitäisi suhtautua liian naiivisti puheisiin kulttuuriyhteistyön jatkamisesta ja lisäämisestä.

Venäläisten ja heitä tukevien ylimielisyys ynnä halveksuttava käytös ei enää edes hämmästytä minua. Reilu vuosi sitten kuvittelin tällaisen käytöksen hitaasti hiipuvan, mutta yhä edelleen tämä öykkärimäisesti käyttäytyvä venäläisjoukkio, on se, joka kontrolloi tilaa muiden venäläisten jäädessä selkeään vähemmistöön (tai tyytyen olemaan hiljaa). Toimintaansa venäläiset tuntuvat saavan energiaa myös ehtymättömästä kyvystä uhriutua ja nähdä syytä kohteluunsa vain muissa. Venäläisten puolustukseksi ei käy myöskään se, että valtio on totalitaarinen hallinnon vastustajien rangaistusten ollessa pitkiä. Kuten ei sekään, että ollessaan epäpoliittisia henkilöitä, he suojelevat omaisiaan ja läheisiään (tai haluavat edes pitää välinsä niihin kunnossa).

Edelliset eivät käy puolustukseksi, koska olemme nähneet venäläisten käyneen vastarintaan yksittäin tai ryhmiä, rohkeimmat ovat tarttuneet aseeseen ja lähteneet sotimaan maanmiehiään vastaan. Venäjän hallinnon tuomitsijoita löytyy Suomestakin, osa Suomessa asuvista venäläisistä on hyvin aktiivisia somessa kamppaillen siellä Kremlin valheita vastaan. Mikäli Venäjä aikoo joku päivä palata sivistysvaltioiden joukkoon, on venäläisillä kollektiivisesti edessä melkoinen itsetutkiskelun ja omien toimiensa tarkastelun aika – eikä vain omien vaan edessä on koko maan menneisyyden tekojen kriittinen tarkastelu ja sovittaminen. Ilman tätä Venäjä on syytä pitää eristettynä, kunnes halua menneisyyden kriittiseen tarkasteluun ja tekojen sovittamiseen on olemassa.

 

Marko

 

Lähteet:

1. https://www.is.fi/jaakiekko/art-2000009293343.html 

2. https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000009239132.html 

3. https://yle.fi/a/3-12450742 

4. https://yle.fi/a/3-12436052 

5. https://www.hs.fi/kotimaa/art-2000008779634.html 

6. https://putinintrollit.fi/2022/05/05/suomenvenalaisten-whatsapp-ryhmassa-keskustellaan-aseiden-tuomisesta-venaja-mieliseen-kulkueeseen-ja-lietsotaan-vihaa-ukrainalaisia-vastaan/ 

7. https://twitter.com/Chriscoveries/status/1651899668115361794 

*: Tarkoitan etenkin aikaa ennen 24. helmikuuta 2022 ja Yleisradion venäjänkielisiä uutisia, joiden sisältöä venäläisen maailman (Russkij Mir) vaikutuspiirissä olleet venäjää osanneet ihmiset ovat kritisoineet sisällöttömiksi ja todellisia ongelmia vältteleviksi.

Blogini Suomalais-venäläisen RuFi ry:n vaikuttamisesta Suomessa, julkaistu 1. toukokuuta 2022: RuFi ry –Venäjän pienimuotoista vaikuttamista Suomessa.

Samaisesta aiheesta englanniksi: RuFi ry –part of Russian propaganda and influence in Finland.

Esimerkkinä mainitusta Russian Imperial Movementista eli RIM:stä blogissa: Venäläistä imperialismia edistävän Russian Imperial Movementin monikansalliset yhteistyökuviot.

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