tiistai 22. elokuuta 2023

Those “ordinary Russians” living in Finland: joining to Armed Forces of Russia


This text is based on my Finnish-language blog “Those ‘ordinary Russians’ fighting in the Armed Forces of Russia” (Fin. Ne ”tavalliset venäläiset” sotimassa Venäjän riveissä), which I published on July 8, 2023. For readers’ information, I have added more individual pictures to the blog. You should also note that some of the Russians living in Finland I mentioned in the blog have lived in our country for years or even decades. So, their enlistment as mercenaries or their support of Russian warfare cannot therefore be explained by the fact that they had only lived in Finland for a short time. Due to the Finnish Criminal Code, I have covered the faces of some of the pictures. Persons whose faces are covered live permanently in Finland.

 

Those “ordinary Russians” living in Finland: joining to Armed Forces of Russia

Over the years, I have made observations and written them down in the form of blogs about Finns fighting in Russia’s proxy forces or Russian subordinate forces in Eastern Ukraine; equally, I have observed the participation of Finns and Russians living in Finland in anti-Ukraine campaigning and information warfare in Finland and other countries. Part of this kind of campaigning can be considered a hybrid influence aimed at Finland – in practice a hybrid war, because for Russia it’s all about warfare, not hybrid influence. We Finns just scorn the name hybrid war, perhaps because in our mind’s warfare has a more concrete purpose meaning “blood and guts.”

In this blog, my attention is focused especially on Russians living in Finland who enlist in the Russian forces in Ukraine or support Russia’s military operations in Ukraine, some have been doing this since 2014, when the war in Donbas began.

Photo collage of Finns and Russians living in Finland working for Russia.










On June 27, 2023, Helsingin Sanomat published a background article “On Russia’s side” (Venäjän puolella), in which the journalists examined the hidden network of foreign fighters who fought in the Armed Forces of Russia in Eastern Ukraine. Marie-Agnes Strack-Zimmermann, chairwoman of the German Parliament’s defense committee, said the following about the network in question:

Such people with real war experience - who possibly killed others without remorse - are dangerous to our society.” (1)

With the article, I decided to write a blog about my own observations about Russians living in Finland (or people who speak Russian and living in Finland) who have participated in the war with the Russian forces in Eastern Ukraine in one way or another. This group also includes Russians who lived in Finland and have returned to Russia after February 24, 2022, to participate in Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine.

However, at the beginning of my writing, a brief review of the involvement of Russians or pro-Russians living in Finland in activities supporting Russia and influence in Finland, after Russia’s occupation of the Crimean Peninsula (February-March 2014) and the war started in Eastern Ukraine in April 2014. Their activity has been so long-term, and it has involved so much various levels of activism that this review only includes some key points and noteworthy events (with sources and background text links).

One of the most significant branches of this activity, influence and activism that includes targeted harassment is the result of an article written by Yleisradio journalist Jessikka Aro about the Russian troll factory. (2) Mainly Finns participated in the widespread harassment (it was practically psychological violence), but in which e.g., Johan Bäckman use of his contacts in Russia building it up. He also used various Russian media for a smear campaign against journalist Aro. I recommend everyone to read the non-fiction book ‘Putinin trollit – Tositarinoita Venäjän infosodan rintamilta’ of Russia’s information war written by Jessikka Aro and translated into several languages.

For years, attention in Finland was paid only to information influencing and propagandistic communication carried out by Russia and the Russians living in our country. Involvement in other activism and possible hybrid warfare operations emerged more broadly in connection with investigations related to special real estate deals and construction projects. But even then, Finland was careful not to talk about Russia’s possible hybrid operations or preparations for some Gray area activity. In her book ‘Putinin pihapiirissä,’ Tuula Malin brings up vague business acquaintances along with numerous shady real estate transactions. Despite this, e.g., in the case of Airisto’s pearl (Airiston Helmi), the official communications in Finland spoke of financial crime, while in Latvia, on the other hand, in the case of the same oligarch – Pavel Melnikov – there was essentially a more direct reference to possible security threats that the person’s holdings in the country create. (3)

The support of the Russian administration’s politics and imperialist wars of conquest was best seen in Finland precisely in the field of information influence and propaganda war. After Russia occupied the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in February-March 2014, activities supporting Russia began to be organized more widely in Finland, by Finns who support the Russian regime and Russians living in Finland. In the beginning, their public activities were oriented towards events that received media coverage. At that time, the attitude of the Finnish media to the events was childishly naive, some journalists even seemed to believe the propaganda stories about “separatism” in Donbas and “persecuting the Russians.” The later events were clearly more propagandistic, which the Finnish media could take a more critical view of.

In addition to the organization of various events and occasions, association activities played a more visible role, in which Finns and persons of Russian background living in Finland – or persons who declared themselves Russian in the armed forces – actively participated. Among the prominent associations, the DNR-edustamiskeskus ry ( appeared as the official representative of the “Donetsk People’s Republic” in Finland. Naturally, it didn’t really have that role, even though the people behind the operation claimed so. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland had to correct the disinformation spread by the association. (4)

DNR-edustamiskeskus ry and Donetskin kansantasavallan ystävät Suomessa organized a few Christmas parties, which were attended not only by Finns but also by Russians living in Finland. At least once among the guests was also Natalia Nikonorova from the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine. At that time, Nikonorova appeared at the event in the role of “Foreign Minister,” which role she had in the puppet administration appointed by the Kremlin. In the first years of its activity, DNR-edustamiskeskus ry was highly active as a spreader of propaganda and disinformation. Propaganda material from Russia and the occupied territories of eastern Ukraine was also brought to Finland through it. In the last years of visible activism, among the collaborators of DNR-edustamiskeskus ry was also RUFI – suomalais-venäläinen yhdistys ry, which supported the imperialist policy of the Russian government, and was headed by Daria Skippari-Smirnov at the time.

Under Skippari-Smirnov’s leadership, the first Immortal Regiment March was organized in Finland in May 2017. (5) After this, Skippari-Smirnov has organized two more Immortal Regiment marches in the name of RUFI and, after the corona pandemic, in May 2022, a car march that ended in Helsinki. During the active years, a lot of disinformation and pro-Russia propaganda was shared on the association’s social media platforms and website. Under the leadership of Skippari-Smirnov, the association also played a prominent role in the journey to the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula in the spring of 2018.

Johan Bäckman’s recruitment of fighters to the Russian proxy forces in Eastern Ukraine (especially in 2015 and 2016), and the delivery of various materials to the war zone in Eastern Ukraine through Russia, played its part in the activities in Finland. People of Russian background living in Finland and the companies they own also have part of this activity. (6)

I have previously written several blogs on the subject, the most recent one in December 2021. In recent years, the Finnish media have also more actively examined such activities and direct participation in hostilities in the Armed Forces of Russia – this was also the case in the extensive article published in Helsingin Sanomat and the articles published in Yleisradio in autumn and winter 2021. (7 and 8) In my blogs, I have focused mainly on the recruitment of fighters of Finnish background. But this time I am focusing on the participation of people of Russian background living in Finland in the war in Eastern Ukraine and specifically in the Armed Forces of Russia. Helsingin Sanomat’s article on ‘Venäjän puolella’ offers an excellent basis from which to proceed.

 

Onko tšuhna nenästä vedettävä – Are we Finns idiots, in Russian tšuhna is a derogatory term used for Finns

After the introduction, we can then move on to the matter itself, i.e., to examine the participation of persons of Russian background living in Finland in the Russian Army in the war in Ukraine. In my writing, however, I ignore the examination of the mercenary army connected to Gennadi Timchenko, which has recently caused a lot of buzz in Finland as well. (9) The reason for sidelining the topic is simple. A closer look at the mercenary army, or Redut, connected to Timchenko would make this article far too long. But the fact that before this year no attention was paid in Finland to Timchenko’s ownership of Redut, speaks volumes about the secrecy that has prevailed around Gennadi Timchenko on a wider scale. Note Timchenko also has Finnish citizenship!

In Finland, the idea that Vladimir Putin’s political opponents in Russia would automatically oppose the war (or the so-called special operation) has been pampered for a very long time. However, such a belief is completely wrong! In May 2023, Sergei Porohovoi, an activist of The Other Russia of E. V. Limonov party who lived in Finland for more than a decade, returned to Russia of his own free will, announcing that he was ready to join the forces of the Interbrigady movement operating in the Russian-occupied Donbas region as a volunteer. Interbrigady movement have been fighting against Ukraine as part of Russian forces in eastern Ukraine since 2014. The forces in question are suspected of having committed war crimes in the war zone of eastern Ukraine. According to an activist source known to Porohovoi, Porohovoi decided to return to Russia, after life in Finland became mentally impossible due to Ukraine frenzy and Russophobia. (10)

In The Other Russia of E. V. Limonov party, founded by Eduard Limonov, extreme leftism and fascism were combined into a national Bolshevik ideology. National Bolshevism is a political movement that combines nationalism and Bolshevism. The ideological anti-Americanism is also significant for the movement. The original goal of The Other Russia of E. V. Limonov party has been, among other things, referendums in Russian-majority areas in Russia’s border neighbours on joining Russia. Today, Russia has become radicalized to such an extent that National Bolshevism is not much different from the “ideology” in power in Russia, where Putinism and fascism have combined to form Russism. Now we must ask ourselves whether we have been a little too naive when it comes to Putin’s political opponents and our attitude towards them.

Porohovoi was one of Putin’s ideological opponents, but he has returned to Russia and is ready to participate in Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine, but how many ‘porohovoi’s’ have we raised on our knees?

In Helsingin Sanomat’s article on ”Venäjän puolella,” comments are asked from a Russian living in Finland, Pavel i.e., Pavel N, about his participation in the war with Russia against Ukraine. Pavel, like many others, acknowledges that he was on a humanitarian mission and did not participate in the fighting. The same was claimed by British citizen Benjamin Stimson, who years ago in Great Britain was sentenced to several years in prison for participating in the war in Russian proxy forces against the Ukrainian government. (11) Stimson, like Pavel, has appeared in pictures with an assault rifle in a war zone, which was enough for Stimson to be sentenced.

In the Helsingin Sanomat article, a picture of Pavel holding a weapon that looks like an assault rifle has been picked up. According to Pavel, it is a weapon used in airsoft. A couple of active reservists gave me a reasoned dissenting opinion, so it may or may not be an airsoft gun. On the social media of Pavel’s friends, you can find more interesting pictures in which Pavel N. also appears – in some of the pictures, armed.

Some of the pictures in which Pavel N. and his friends appear were probably taken in connection with airsoft, but the activity and training seen in some of the pictures reminds me of something other than airsoft. Based on the dilapidated buildings visible in the photos, they were taken somewhere other than Finland. Based on the names of the people in the photos, I would conclude that they were taken either around St. Petersburg in Russia or possibly in the eastern parts of Estonia.*

Pavel N., partial image of the original image.












“Airsoft” training “out there somewhere.”












A picture of the area where Russians living in Finland also go to practice “airsoft.” Location likely near St. Petersburg, Russia. 














The pictures inevitably remind me of the pictures from years ago that were published from the Partizan camps organized by the Russian Imperial Movement or from the camps of the Evraziyskiy Soyuz molodezhi i.e. ESM, which were attended by teens and a young adult from the eastern parts of Ukraine years before the war started by Russia in 2014. (12 and 13) ESM’s ideological “youth camps” were events where Eurasianism (or neo-Eurasianism) was spread to Russia's neighbouring countries through the networks created. Along with Evraziyskiy Soyuz molodezhi, similar activities were also carried out through Mezhdunarodnoe Evraziyskoe Dvizhenie, both based on the ideas of Aleksandr Dugin.

When browsing the social media network of Pavel N and his friends, there are also other persons of Russian background who declare their place of residence in Finland, who have delivered material aid at least since 2014 to the war zone of eastern Ukraine, more precisely, to the areas occupied by Russia. This means that, with a very high probability, they have driven to the area via Russia (at the very least guilty of the Ukrainian state border crime, at the most a lot more). “Cure Morozov,” who claims to be based in Turku, has published a picture on social media which are taken in frontline conditions, along with aid pictures.

Despite the international verdict and Russia's extensive war crimes, February 24, 2022, has not formed a limit to Russian support for Russia by Russians living in Finland or pro-Russian Finns. As can be seen from the Helsingin Sanomat article, Pavel N has been sharing PMC Wagner’s recruitment ads on social media since February 24, 2022, but has gone even further. I know of at least one case where a man of Russian background who moved to Finland a few years ago (before the corona pandemic) – Yevgeni K – has returned to Russia to participate in Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.

Yevgeni K’s background is so interesting that you would think it would also arouse our authorities. According to reliable information, before moving to Finland, he worked in Russia in special forces under the Ministry of the Interior in St. Petersburg and/or the Leningrad region, rising to the rank of officer. He moved to Finland after his service contract ended. Those who know him suspect (justifiably) that Yevgeni K hid his true work history and background when he arrived in Finland.

It can at least be stated that, so far, the actions of our authorities regarding the investigation of the actions of those who fought in the Russian forces have been quite lax. Coincidentally, just today Ilta-Sanomat published an extensive article that talked about the long-running investigation by the Häme police and The National Bureau of Investigation, the target of which is a Russian man living in Finland, who, according to Ukrainian sources, has fought in the PMC Wagner owned by Yevgeni Prigozhin. (14) It is noteworthy that the man was treated as a possible witness in the chain of events related to the shot down of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17.

Image from the Ilta-Sanomat article, July 8, 2023.











It is interesting that Suojelupoliisi – Finnish Security and Intelligence Service (Supo) has not publicly paid attention to the Finnish foreign fighters who fought in the forces of Russia in Eastern Ukraine. Instead, in his national terrorism threat assessment published this spring, Supo warns about individual extremists who have traveled to fight on the other side, i.e., with the Ukrainian forces. A journalist from Helsingin Sanomat asked Supo what they think about those Finns who have participated in the war in Donbas on the Russian side – “Does Supo consider them a security threat? What kind of security risk can they cause when they return to Finland?” (15) Supo’s answer was that they have nothing to comment on. Instead, according to researcher Kacper Rekawek, who specializes in foreign fighters who fought in Ukraine, foreign fighters who have returned to their home countries and fought in the ranks of Russia are especially now a security threat – “In practice, they are Russian agents.” (16)

The same evasion on the part of our authorities was already noticeable years ago, when I made a request for an investigation into the activities of Johan Bäckman and Janus Putkonen. I covered the case in more detail in my blog on December 4, 2021. For those who can’t read the blog, I state that the National Prosecution Authority decided that there is no reason for a preliminary investigation. I was hoping that tšuhna has caught on since then, but I’m afraid I’m wrong. The Russians are still laughing at the naive tšuhna!

 

Marko

 

Sources:

1. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html  (Behind paywall). 

2. https://kioski.yle.fi/omat/kioski-pietarin-trollitehtaalla 

3. https://ir.lv/2018/11/30/russias-hand/ 

4. https://vartiopaikalla.blogspot.com/2017/12/kaiken-takana-on-backman.html 

5. https://www.verkkouutiset.fi/a/venalaisten-yhdistys-tuomassa-voitonpaivan-kuolemattoman-rykmentin-marssia-suomeen-64692/#194c9420 

6. https://vartiopaikalla.blogspot.com/2019/03/kalastelua-johan-backmanin-verkoilla.html 

7. https://yle.fi/a/3-12153718 

8. https://yle.fi/a/3-12210484 

9. https://www.iltalehti.fi/ulkomaat/a/ccc85850-6026-4ef4-9b2a-2e673a603fef 

10. https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009578041.html 

11. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/british-man-prorussian-forces-ukraine-jailed-terrorism-benjamin-stimson-a7842521.html 

12. https://m.vk.com/partizan_kurs 

13. http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2016/01/how-alexander-dugins-neo-eurasianists.html 

14. https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009701271.html 

15. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html 

16. https://www.hs.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000009511795.html 


*: When analyzing the networks of people of Russian background living in Finland, it is also revealed that at least some of them have connections with the Russian imperialist Russian Imperial Movement, or RIM, headquartered in St. Petersburg. As well as to members of RIM who have fought in the Russian forces in eastern Ukraine.

RIM organizes military training for various groups in St. Petersburg and the Leningrad region. The courses organized by it have also been attended by members of the Nordic Resistance Movement. I would not consider it impossible that Russians living in Finland would go to RIM’s camps to train. Yes, maybe at these camps they practice that “airsoft”!

Note – In the near future, I will translate the continuation of this blog into English, where I will be more specific about the connections of Russians living in Finland to Russian extremists, such as the Russian Imperial Movement.


#StandWithUkraine 


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